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Across many nations, including the United States, individu-
als from relatively lower-class backgrounds are more likely 
to experience a host of negative outcomes, such as poorer 
cognitive performance (Nisbett, 2007), poorer academic 
achievement (Sirin, 2005; Stephens, Fryberg, Markus, 
Johnson, & Covarrubias, 2012; Stephens, Markus, & 
Fryberg, 2012), lower subjective well-being (Diener, Ng, 
Harter, & Arora, 2010; Howell & Howell, 2008), as well as 
increased mortality (Adler et al., 1994; Gallo & Matthews, 
2003; Kawachi, Kennedy, Lochner, & Prothrow-Stith, 1997; 
Wilkinson, 1999). In particular, the negative impact of 
reduced economic and social resources on physical health 
has motivated much research into the underlying causes of 
this pattern and, more important, the factors that might miti-
gate it (e.g., Chen & Miller, 2012; Lachman & Weaver, 
1998). In the present research, we test the prediction that lay 
beliefs that downplay the biological and fixed bases of social 
class can buffer lower-class individuals from the experience 
of poor health and negative affect.
Social Class and Health
Across race, gender, and geographic location, lower-class 
individuals have poorer health and higher mortality rates 
than upper-class individuals (Adler et al., 1994; Kawachi 
et al., 1997; Ross et al., 2006; Wilkinson, 1999). This pattern 
has been observed across both objective measures of social 
class—typically assessed by some combination of one’s 
income (Drentea & Lavrakas, 2000), education attainment 
(Snibbe & Markus, 2005), and occupation status (Oakes & 
Rossi, 2003)—and subjective measures of social class— 
typically assessed by comparisons of one’s own material 
resources with that of others (Adler et al., 1994; Cohen et al., 
2008).
Several explanations for this robust link between social 
class and health have been proposed—related to access to 
environments that prevent disease and help cure illness 
(Gordon-Larsen, Nelson, Page, & Popkin, 2006; Link & 
Phelan, 1995; Moore & Diez Roux, 2006; Stead, MacAskill, 
MacKintosh, Reece, & Eadie, 2001), and resources neces-
sary to afford the costs of health coverage (Carpiano, Link, & 
Phelan, 2008; Chang & Lauderdale, 2009; Link & Phelan, 
1995; Starfield & Budetti, 1985). Unfortunately, active 
health promotion efforts face significant challenges because 
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some health promotion behaviors (e.g., regular exercise, reg-
ular medical exams) tend to be perceived as inconsistent with 
the social self or group identity of individuals from relatively 
lower-class backgrounds (Oyserman, Fryberg, & Yoder, 
2007; Stephens, Markus, & Fryberg, 2012).
A growing body of research has assessed potential psy-
chosocial variables that can reduce this social class health 
gradient. For instance, social capital—which includes social 
support, membership in organizations, and degree of trust in 
a community—may mitigate health inequality by boosting 
relatively lower-class individuals’ access to and motivations 
to engage in health-benefiting behaviors (Berkman, 1995; 
Kawachi et al., 1997; Wilkinson, 1994). Evidence also sug-
gests that belief systems can moderate class effects on health. 
For example, Lachman and Weaver (1998) demonstrated 
that elevated control beliefs—perceived personal mastery of 
and lack of personal constraints in the environment—among 
lower-class individuals were associated with comparable 
self-rated health levels with their upper-class counterparts. 
This is presumably because an elevated sense of control over 
one’s outcomes promotes beliefs that one’s own actions can 
improve the life course (Lachman, Ziff, & Spiro, 1994) and 
protects against feelings of helplessness (Langer, 1975; 
Seligman, 1975; Taylor, 1989). Aligning with the assertion 
that belief systems can affect lower-class individuals’ health, 
we propose that lay theories about the determinants of social 
class can shape health outcomes. We elaborate on this gen-
eral prediction in the sections that follow.
Lay Theories of Social Class Categories
Perceptions of social groups in society can be influenced by 
a number of lay theories about how those groups are formed 
(Cimpian & Salomon, 2014; Yzerbyt & DeMoulin, 2010). 
Essentialist theories about social categories rest on the 
assumption that an individual’s membership in a specific cat-
egory (e.g., racial group, gender, social class) is rooted in 
biology or genes and is fixed and stable across the life course 
(Allport, 1954; N. Haslam, Rothschild, & Ernst, 2000; 
Keller, 2005; Kraus & Keltner, 2013; Williams & Eberhardt, 
2008). Nonessentialist theories about social categories, in 
contrast, assume that an individual’s social group member-
ship is not biologically determined and may not be fixed or 
immutable (Bastian & Haslam, 2006; N. Haslam, Bastian, 
Bain, & Kashima, 2006; N. Haslam, Bastian, & Bissett, 
2004; Williams & Eberhardt, 2008). In other words, essen-
tialist beliefs place a greater emphasis on internal biological 
explanations for patterns of behavior (Williams & Eberhardt, 
2008), whereas nonessentialist beliefs reject such inherent 
explanations, allowing for the possibility that social catego-
ries and behavior can change and be reconstituted (e.g., 
Keller, 2005; Kraus & Keltner, 2013).
We propose that differential beliefs in the origins of social 
class categories will have implications for self-rated health 
and negative affect. Specifically, we hypothesize that indi-
viduals from relatively lower-class backgrounds who endorse 
essentialist beliefs will report poorer self-rated health and 
increased negative self-conscious affect—that is, negative 
affect that is directed specifically at the self (e.g., Tangney, 
Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007)—relative to upper-class individ-
uals, whereas lower-class individuals who endorse nonessen-
tialist beliefs will not show these relative deficits in health 
and affect. The logic behind this prediction is as follows: 
Essentialist beliefs about social class imply that one’s social 
class is caused by biological elements and is fixed across the 
life course. The biological and fixed aspects of essentialist 
beliefs, we predict, enhance chronic negative self-conscious 
affect (e.g., shame, anxiety, guilt) for individuals from rela-
tively lower-class backgrounds because such beliefs suggest 
that subordinate status is both based on an individual’s own 
biology (i.e., I have bad genes) and is likely to persist across 
the life course. In contrast, rejecting such biological explana-
tions suggest that subordinate status is not the specific fault 
of one’s own biology and has the potential to change in the 
future. Thus, nonessentialist beliefs, we predict, will buffer 
lower-class individuals from the experience of chronic nega-
tive self-conscious affect that arises from beliefs that subor-
dinate status is fixed and due to one’s own internal biology. 
Over time, lower-class individuals who endorse nonessen-
tialist beliefs may—as a result of their decreased experience 
of negative self-conscious affect—have health outcomes that 
are similar to those experienced by their upper-class 
counterparts.
Social Class, Negative Self-Conscious 
Affect, and Self-Rated Health
Although our central hypothesis has not been formally tested 
in prior research, several lines of indirect evidence suggest 
that in comparison with essentialist beliefs, nonessentialist 
beliefs buffer individuals from relatively lower-class back-
grounds from experiencing negative self-conscious affect 
and poorer self-rated health: Prior research indicates that 
beliefs that ability is inherent to the individual, rather than 
learned or improved with effort, create a fatalistic sense of 
academic performance and subsequently reduce the likeli-
hood that children will seek to improve their academic abili-
ties (e.g., Dweck, 1986; Molden & Dweck, 2006). As well, 
individuals who believe that social class is essentialist are 
also more likely to believe that the world is fair and just 
(Kraus & Keltner, 2013). This pattern of results is suggestive 
of the possibility that lower-class individuals who endorse 
essentialist beliefs will view their own subordinate status as 
inevitable and justified—which we predict will exacerbate 
the experience of chronic negative self-conscious affect and 
poorer health for these individuals.
In our hypothesis of relationships between social class, lay 
theories, and self-rated health, we propose that essentialist 
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beliefs in social class will elicit chronic experiences of nega-
tive self-conscious affect in lower-class individuals which, 
over time, will manifest in reduced self-rated health. The 
proposition that negative self-conscious affect is potentially 
causal in increasing negative health outcomes is supported by 
a number of studies linking health and affect: Evidence sug-
gests that negative affect is an important precursor to poor 
health (Booth-Kewley & Friedman, 1987; Cohen et al., 1995; 
Dickerson, Gruenewald, & Kemeny, 2004; Gallo & Matthews, 
2003). In particular, more recent research have pinned down 
the specific role of negative self-conscious emotions in shap-
ing physiological profiles that are detrimental to health.
Studies have examined the health impact of negative self-
conscious emotions by inducing these emotions through social 
self-threat (e.g., having participants deliver a speech in front of 
stoic evaluators). Across this body of research, studies have 
found that inducing negative self-conscious emotions tends to 
increase cortisol levels (Dickerson & Kemeny, 2004; 
Gruenewald, Kemeny, Aziz, & Fahey, 2004), proinflamma-
tory cytokine activity, as well as activation of the hypotha-
lamic–pituitary–adrenocortical (HPA) axis (Cannon, 1932; 
Dickerson, Gruenewald, & Kemeny, 2004; Kemeny, 2003; 
Kemeny & Shestyuk, 2008). Chronic exposure to HPA activa-
tion (measured by increases in cortisol) and proinflammatory 
cytokine activity precipitates many precursors to poor health, 
such as systemic inflammation, visceral fat accumulation, and 
increased blood pressure (Brotman, Golden, & Wittstein, 
2007; Everson-Rose & Lewis, 2005; Rozanski, Blumenthal, 
Davidson, Saab, & Kubzansky, 2005), which eventually mani-
fest as chronic illness. Together, the above evidence is sugges-
tive of our hypothesis that lay beliefs can moderate associations 
between social class and negative self-rated health through 
experiences of chronic self-conscious affect.
The Present Research
We tested three hypotheses in the present research related to 
the tendency for essentialist beliefs to moderate associations 
between social class and self-rated health: Lower-class indi-
viduals who endorse essentialist beliefs will (a) self-report 
experiencing poorer health; and (b) increased negative self-
conscious affect relative to upper-class individuals, whereas 
no such deficits in health or affect will be observed among 
lower-class individuals who endorse nonessentialist beliefs; 
and (c) the tendency for these lay beliefs to moderate asso-
ciations between social class and self-rated health will be 
explained, at least in part, by reported levels of negative self-
conscious affect.
We used three studies to test these predictions. In Study 1, 
we assessed participants’ lay theories about social class and 
their self-rated health. We chose to assess self-rated health as 
our primary indicator of health outcomes because of its con-
sistent associations with mortality rates in large-scale epide-
miological samples (Idler & Benyamini, 1997). We predicted 
that lower-class participants who endorse essentialist beliefs 
about social class would report poorer overall self-rated 
health compared with their upper-class counterparts, but no 
such difference would be observed for participants who 
show low endorsement of essentialist beliefs about social 
class. In Studies 2 and 3, we used an experimental design to 
test the prediction that exposure to lay theories of social class 
would moderate the association between social class and 
momentary fluctuations in self-rated health (Study 3) and 
negative affect (Studies 2 and 3). In Study 3, we sought to 
provide further experimental evidence that lay beliefs about 
social class moderate associations between social class and 
both momentary fluctuations in self-rated health and nega-
tive self-conscious affect, as well as to test the mediating role 
of negative self-conscious affect.
Before describing the studies and evidence, it is important 
to acknowledge several caveats in the present investigation. 
First, the logic of our predictions presupposes that lower-
class individuals who endorse nonessentialist beliefs will be 
buffered from the experience of negative health and self-
conscious affect because these individuals will believe that 
their subordinate status is not the fault of their own internal 
biology and that their position could change in the future. Of 
note, it is possible that certain samples—those that are 
younger and just developing their own sense of their position 
in society—may be particularly likely to view nonessential-
ist beliefs in this fashion. As American society is character-
ized by low levels of social mobility (Burkhauser, Feng, 
Jenkins, & Larrimore, 2012; Fiske & Markus, 2012; Piketty 
& Saez, 2003), older individuals who have lived a lifetime of 
subordinate status may not view nonessentialist beliefs as 
optimistically as we predict and, as a result, may not receive 
the same theorized benefits in health and affect from this 
type of belief system.
Second, our hypothesized model suggests that lay theo-
ries of social class moderate associations between social 
class and health outcomes through the experience of chronic 
negative self-conscious affect. Notably, the experimental 
paradigms we employ in Studies 2 and 3, although they 
attempt to establish causal associations between social class, 
lay theories, and self-rated health and affect, should be inter-
preted with caution: It is unclear how much momentary shifts 
in self-rated health and negative self-conscious affect corre-
spond to chronic levels of these constructs that are more 
closely related to physiological health outcomes, mortality, 
and well-being (e.g., Kraus, Adler, & Chen, 2013; Operario, 
Adler, & Williams, 2004).
Third, although our model examines health outcomes 
related to social class and lay theories, the samples include 
relatively healthy university students. Thus, applications of 
these methods to specific diseases and chronically ill popula-
tions should be made with caution and not before the find-
ings have been replicated. We return to each of these points 
in the “General Discussion” section.
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Study 1: Lay Theories About Social 
Class and Self-Rated Health
The goal of Study 1 was to examine if individuals’ lay beliefs 
about social class would influence the association between 
social class and self-rated health. To examine this relation-
ship, we used a correlational design to assess individuals’ 
social class, their lay theories about social class, and their 
self-rated physical health.
Method
Participants. One hundred sixty-nine participants (112 
females, 57 males) from a national online sample took part in 
the study. The mean age was 35.04 years (SD = 12.57). The 
majority of the participants were European American (n = 
112) while the rest included Asian Americans (n = 27), Afri-
can Americans (n = 9), Native Americans (n = 3), Latino 
(n = 1), and Other or multiple ethnic groups (n = 17). In 
terms of their social class backgrounds, 42.9% of partici-
pants reported annual incomes of US$50,000 or less while 
39.3% of participants had high school graduation as their 
highest level of education completed. Participants were 
recruited through advertisements on Craigslist.org, and they 
participated for a chance to win small gift certificates to an 
online retailer. This sample of participants was part of a 
larger study that was reported in Kraus and Keltner (2013; 
see Study 1). No participants were excluded from the origi-
nal sample in this present study.
Procedure. The study was completed online. Participants first 
filled out a self-report measure of their physical health on the 
Medical Outcomes Study–Short Form (MOS-SF) 36-item 
Health Survey (Ware & Sherbourne, 1992), followed by the 
measure of lay theories of social class that was adapted from 
a previous measure of essentialism (see Williams & Eber-
hardt, 2008). Next, participants rated their social class using 
measures from previous research (Adler, Epel, Castellazzo, 
& Ickovics, 2000; Kraus, Piff, & Keltner, 2009), and then 
filled out their demographic information. Finally, partici-
pants were debriefed about the study hypotheses.
Materials
Social class. We assessed two indices of social class—
objective measures of material resources and subjective per-
ceptions of social class rank. Objective material resources 
were measured by having participants report their personal 
educational attainment and annual income (Kraus et al., 
2009). Participants reported their educational attainment by 
choosing one of four categories: (a) less than high school 
education, (b) high school education, (c) college graduation, 
and (d) postgraduate degree. They also reported their annual 
income by choosing one of eight categories: (a) less than 
US$15,000, (b) US$15,001 to US$25,000, (c) US$25,001 to 
US$35,000, (d) US$35,001 to US$50,000, (e) US$50,001 to 
US$75,000, (f) US$75,001 to US$100,000, (g) US$100,001 
to US$150,000, and (h) greater than US$150,000. Fifteen 
participants did not report their annual income, and 1 par-
ticipant did not report his educational attainment. As educa-
tional attainment and annual income were correlated, r(151) = 
.29, p < .001, they were standardized and averaged to form 
an objective social class index, with higher scores indicating 
higher objective social class. Consistent with prior research, 
objective and subjective social class were significantly cor-
related, r(167) = .45, p < .001.
Subjective social class rank was measured using the 
MacArthur Scale of Subjective Socioeconomic Status (Adler 
et al., 2000; Kraus et al., 2009). For this measure, partici-
pants were asked to place an “X” on a rung of a ladder that 
indicates their perceptions of where they stand in terms of 
education, income, and occupation status, relative to others 
in their local community. Each rung of the ladder was repre-
sented by a number from 1 to 10, with higher numbers indi-
cating higher perceptions of social class rank (M = 5.89, 
SD = 1.86).
Lay theories about social class categories. Participants’ 
lay beliefs about social class categories were assessed by a 
10-item self-report measure of essentialism, following the 
factor structure established by Kraus and Keltner (2013). 
This scale included items that, for example, reflect beliefs 
that social class is at least partially based in biological tem-
perament or genetic tendency, can be determined without 
clothing cues, and is determined by circumstances (reverse-
scored). Participants rated their agreement with the state-
ments on a 7-point Likert-type scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = 
strongly agree). The scale was reliable (M = 3.54, SD = .83, 
α = .81) and all items were averaged to give a single score of 
lay theories about social class. Higher scores indicated stron-
ger endorsement of essentialist beliefs about social class.
Self-rated general health. Participants rated their general 
physical health using the Short Form 36-item Health Sur-
vey (Ware & Sherbourne, 1992), which consists of 36 items 
assessing various aspects of physical health, such as social 
functioning, emotional well-being, and general physical 
health. In this study, we were primarily interested in the gen-
eral physical health index, given its wide usage in previous 
research examining links between social class and health 
(Adler et al., 2000; Kopp, Skrabski, Réthelyi, Kawachi, & 
Adler, 2004; Kraus, Adler, & Chen, 2013). Furthermore, 
many epidemiological studies also found that this index is a 
strong predictor of mortality (e.g., Idler & Benyamini, 1997). 
Examples of the general physical health items are “In gen-
eral, would you say your health is _________. (1 = excellent, 
5 = poor),” “My health is excellent,” and “I am as healthy as 
anybody I know” (1 = definitely true, 5 = definitely false). All 
5 items were reliable (M = 3.54, SD = .62, α = .82) and were 
averaged to create a single self-rated general health index, 
with higher scores indicating better general health.1
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Results
First, we examined the correlations between all our variables 
of interest. Objective social class was positively correlated 
with participants’ self-rated general health, r(167) = .23, p = 
.002. The individual components of objective social class 
were also positively correlated with the self-rated general 
health: current income, r(152) = .21, p = .008; educational 
attainment, r(166) = .18, p = .02. These results are consistent 
with the social class health gradient in that individuals in a 
higher social class standing reported better health outcomes 
than individuals in a lower social class standing. As reported 
previously (Kraus & Keltner, 2013), subjective social class 
was positively correlated with lay beliefs about social class, 
such that individuals who rated themselves higher in social 
class rank were more likely to endorse essentialist beliefs 
about social class, r(167) = .22, p < .001. The objective social 
class index was not correlated with lay beliefs about social 
class, r(167) = .07, p = .35.
To examine if lay beliefs about social class influenced 
lower-class individuals’ self-reported health, we ran a hierar-
chical linear regression, with participants’ objective social 
class, lay theories of social class, and their interaction as the 
predictor variables (centered), and self-reported general 
health as the criterion variable (see Aiken & West, 1991). 
The analysis yielded a main effect of objective social class, 
β = .24, t(166) = 3.24, p = .001, 95% confidence interval 
(CI) = [.09, .39], such that individuals who are higher in 
objective social class reported better general health than indi-
viduals who are lower in objective social class. There was 
also a nonsignificant tendency for individuals who were less 
likely to endorse essentialist beliefs to report better general 
health than those who endorsed essentialist beliefs, β = −.14, 
t(166) = −1.82, p = .07, 95% CI = [−.28, .01].
Central to our first hypothesis, we found a significant 
interaction between participants’ social class and lay beliefs 
about social class, β = .22, t(165) = 2.14, p = .03, 95% CI = 
[.02, .42]. Analyses of simple slopes revealed that lower-
class participants who endorsed essentialist beliefs about 
social class (one standard deviation above the mean) 
reported significantly poorer health compared with their 
upper-class counterparts, β = .40, t(165) = 3.83, p < .001, 
95% CI = [.19, .61]. In contrast, lower-class participants 
who were less likely to endorse essentialist beliefs about 
social class (one standard deviation below the mean) 
reported health levels that were equal to that of their upper-
class counterparts, β = .09, t(165) = 0.86, p = .39, 95% CI = 
[−.11, .29]. Furthermore, these lower-class individuals who 
endorsed lower levels of essentialist beliefs about social 
class also reported significantly better health than the lower-
class individuals who endorsed essentialist beliefs about 
social class, β = −.27, t(165) = −2.79, p = .006, 95% 
CI = [−.46, −.08] (see Figure 1). When we ran the same 
regression analyses controlling for race and gender, the 
overall pattern of the interaction between social class and 
endorsement of lay theories of social class on self-rated 
health remained, β = 2.14, t(161) = 2.04, p = .03, 95% 
CI = [.02, .30].2
Interestingly, while subjective social class rank predicted 
participants’ self-reported general health, such that lower-
class participants reported poorer health than upper-class 
participants, β = .16, t(166) = 2.09, p = .04, 95% CI = [.01, 
.32], it did not yield any significant interaction with lay theo-
ries about social class, β = .05, t(165) = 0.67, p = .50, 95% 
CI = [−.10, .20]. We return to this result in the “General 
Discussion” section.
Discussion
Results from Study 1 supported our prediction that endorsing 
lay theories about social class categories moderates the rela-
tionship between social class and self-rated health. 
Specifically, while lower-class participants who endorsed 
essentialist beliefs about social class reported poorer health 
than their upper-class counterparts, this class-based differ-
ence in self-rated health was not observed for participants 
who endorsed nonessentialist beliefs about social class.
Study 1 provided correlational evidence suggesting that 
lay theories about social class moderate the relationship 
between social class and self-rated health. In Study 2, we 
sought to test if lay theories about social class can alter 
lower-class individuals’ momentary experience of negative 
self-conscious emotions—a group of negative emotions 
shown, in prior research, to be a precursor to poor health 
(Dickerson, Gruenewald, & Kemeny, 2004; Gruenewald, 
Kemeny, & Aziz, 2006; Gruenewald et al., 2004).
Study 2: Lay Theories About Social 
Class and Negative Self-Conscious 
Affect
Our goal in Study 2 was to provide initial causal evidence for 
the mitigating effect of lay theories about social class on 



















Figure 1. Interaction between lay theories about social class and 
objective social class on self-rated health in Study 1.
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self-conscious affect by directly manipulating beliefs about 
social class lay theories (see Kraus & Keltner, 2013; Williams 
& Eberhardt, 2008). In this study, we hypothesized that 
exposing lower-class participants to essentialist theories 
about social class should lead to elevated feelings of negative 
self-conscious emotions compared with their upper-class 
counterparts, but this difference should again be attenuated 
when participants are exposed to nonessentialist theories 
about social class.
Method
Participants. Seventy-one undergraduates (43 females, 28 
males) at a public West Coast university participated in the 
study in exchange for course credit. This sample was part of 
a larger study reported in Kraus and Keltner (2013; see Study 
3). Data were collected for this study over the course of one 
academic semester and analyses were not conducted prior to 
obtaining the entire sample. The mean age was 21.35 years 
(SD = 3.58). Participants were Asian Americans (n = 30), 
European Americans (n = 22), Latino or Latina (n = 3), and 
Other or multiple ethnicities (n = 15). One participant did not 
report his ethnicity.
Procedure. Participants were run in small groups and were 
ostensibly told that the study objective was to investigate 
their memory for and retention of material in scientific arti-
cles—the cover story for our manipulation of lay beliefs 
about social class. Participants were showed a list of nine 
titles of scientific articles published by a scientific journal 
and were told they would be randomly assigned to read and 
respond to one of the articles. In actual fact, all of them read 
the article titled “Socioeconomic Status and Its Genetic 
Underpinnings”—our manipulation for lay theories about 
social class. There were two versions of the article in which 
experimental evidence was provided support or no support 
for the biological basis of social class. Participants were ran-
domly assigned to read one of them. After reading the article, 
participants were asked to give the main point of the article 
and their best recall of the information in the article, follow-
ing which, they rated, on a list of emotions words, how they 
felt after reading the article. Finally, they filled out the sub-
jective social class measure as used in Study 1, as well as 
demographic information. They were debriefed about the 
study at the end.
Materials
Manipulation of lay theories about social class. As reported 
in prior research (Kraus & Keltner, 2013), we manipulated 
lay beliefs about social class by randomly assigning par-
ticipants to read one of two scientific journal articles about 
the biological bases of social class. The article advocating 
the biological basis of social class (essentialist perspective) 
argued that researchers found genetic underpinnings to social 
class and that lower-class children inherited social class from 
their parents, were more likely to remain lower class, and 
had genetic similarity to other lower-class people. In con-
trast, the article advocating that social class had no biological 
basis (nonessentialist perspective) argued that researchers 
found lower-class and upper-class individuals to be geneti-
cally similar, that children from lower-class backgrounds 
are equally likely to become upper or lower class, and that 
social class is cultural in origin. As manipulation checks, par-
ticipants were asked the extent to which they agreed with 
two statements: “It is impossible to determine one’s social 
class by examining their genes” (reverse-scored) and “There 
is probably a biological determinant of social class.” Both 
statements were rated on a 7-point Likert-type scale (1 = 
strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). Both statements were 
reliable (M = 2.34, SD = 1.31, α = .73) and were averaged to 
give a single score, where higher scores indicated stronger 
essentialist beliefs about social class.
Negative self-conscious emotions. We measured partici-
pants’ negative self-conscious emotions by asking them to 
rate the extent to which they experienced a list of emotions 
after reading the article. The list consisted of positive emo-
tions (e.g., moved, comfortable, relaxed) and negative emo-
tions (e.g., upset, disgust, fear). The negative self-conscious 
emotions were specifically nervous, guilt, shame, and anx-
ious. All emotions were rated on a 5-point Likert-type scale 
(1 = not at all, 5 = extremely). The negative self-conscious 
emotions were reliable, (M = 1.26, SD = .57, α = .78), and 
were averaged to form a single index of negative self-con-
scious emotions. We also computed the composite for all 
nine negative emotions (M = 1.41, SD = .62, α = .88), all 
five positive emotions (M = 2.29, SD = .69, α = .63), as well 
as a three-item composite of hostility-related emotions (i.e., 
anger, contempt, disgust; M = 1.55, SD = .82, α = .81).
Social class. To assess objective social class, we asked par-
ticipants to report the education completed by their mother 
and father, as well as their household income while growing 
up, by choosing from the same categories of the objective 
social class measures in Study 1. These measures were again 
standardized, and averaged to obtain a single objective social 
class index, where higher scores indicate higher objective 
social class. Once again, we assessed participants’ subjective 
social class rank using the same measure in Study 1 (M = 
5.91, SD = 1.93). One participant did not report her subjec-
tive social class rank. Objective and subjective social class 
were once again correlated, r(68) = .72, p < .001.
Results
Manipulation check. To determine the success of our manipu-
lation of lay theories about social class, we ran an indepen-
dent-samples t test, comparing participants who read the 
article advocating an essentialist perspective of social class 
with those who read the article advocating a nonessentialist 
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perspective of social class on the mean of both our manipula-
tion check items. Indeed, we found that participants reported 
stronger essentialist beliefs when they read the essentialist 
perspective of social class (M = 2.71, SD = 1.41) than those 
who read the nonessentialist perspective of social class (M = 
2.00, SD = 1.12), t(69) = −2.34, p = .02.
Lay theories and negative self-conscious emotions. To examine 
if lower-class individuals differed in their experience of neg-
ative self-conscious emotions depending on their lay beliefs 
about social class categories, we ran a three-way mixed 
ANOVA with lay theories about social class as the between-
subjects factor, objective social class as the covariate, and 
type of emotion (negative self-conscious emotions vs. hostil-
ity-related emotions) as the within-subjects factor. We did 
not find a significant three-way interaction using this analy-
sis, F(1, 67) = .04, p = .84. This finding suggests that partici-
pants did not respond differentially to distinct types of 
negative emotions.
In follow-up analyses, we probed interactions between 
social class, our manipulation of lay theories, and the distinct 
types of negative affect. To examine if lower-class individu-
als differed in their experience of negative self-conscious 
emotions depending on their lay beliefs about social class 
categories, we ran a hierarchical linear regression with par-
ticipants’ objective social class, lay beliefs in social class cat-
egories (coded 0 = nonessentialist beliefs, 1 = essentialist 
beliefs), and their interaction as the predictor variables and 
with their level of experienced negative self-conscious emo-
tions as the criterion variable. The analysis yielded a nonsig-
nificant effect of lay beliefs, β = .13, t(68) = 1.87, p = .07, 
95% CI = [−.48, .02], in the direction of participants who 
read that social class has no biological basis reporting less 
negative self-conscious emotions. There was also no main 
effect of social class on the experience of negative self-con-
scious emotions, β = −.10, t(68) = −0.84, p = .40, 95% CI = 
[−.35, .14].
Central to our hypothesis, we found a significant interac-
tion between participants’ objective social class and lay 
beliefs about social class categories on the experience of 
negative self-conscious emotions, β = .41, t(67) = 2.03, p = 
.046, 95% CI = [.01, .81]. Simple slope analyses revealed 
that among those who read the essentialist perspective of 
social class, lower-class participants reported experiencing 
greater negative self-conscious emotions compared with the 
upper-class participants, β = −.45, t(67) = −2.15, p = .035, 
95% CI = [−.86, −.03]. In contrast, among those who read the 
nonessentialist perspective of social class, lower-class par-
ticipants did not differ in their experience of negative self-
conscious emotions from their upper-class counterparts, β = 
.07, t(67) = 0.49, p = .62, 95% CI = [−.23, .37]. Furthermore, 
we found that lower-class participants who read that social 
class has no biological basis experienced significantly less 
negative self-conscious emotions than those who read that 
social class had a biological basis, β = .52, t(67) = 2.79, 
p = .007, 95% CI = [.15, .89] (see Figure 2). Consistent with 
the results of Study 1, subjective social class did not interact 
with lay theories about social class categories to produce any 
effects on negative self-conscious emotions, β = .04, t(67) = 
0.28, p = .78, 95% CI = [−.21, .28].
Examination of the nine-item overall negative emotions 
index revealed a nonsignificant interaction between social 
class and lay theories, β = −.27, t(67) = −1.87, p = .07, 95% 
CI = [−.55, .02]. Simple slope analyses revealed the same 
pattern of result as for negative self-conscious emotions: 
Lower-class participants reported experiencing greater over-
all negative emotions compared with their upper-class coun-
terparts when they read that social class was biologically 
based, β = −.55, t(67) = −2.74, p = .008, 95% CI = [−.96, 
−.15], whereas social class was not associated with overall 
experience of negative emotions for participants who read 
that social class had no biological basis, β = −.09, t(67) = 
−0.62, p = .54, 95% CI = [−.38, .20]. In addition, these lower-
class participants in the nonessentialism condition also expe-
rienced less overall negative emotions than lower-class 
participants in the essentialism condition, β = .57, t(67) = 
3.15, p = .002, 95% CI = [.21, .93]. This latter finding is 
consistent with the results from our three-way ANOVA—
Essentialist beliefs moderated the relationship between 
social class and negative affect in general, as well as negative 
self-conscious affect in particular.
We also ran a similar analysis examining the five-item 
positive emotion scale, and found no significant interaction 
between lay theories about social class categories and par-
ticipants’ social class on positive emotions, β = .02, t(67) = 
0.14, p = .89, 95% CI = [−.28, .32].
Discussion
Study 2 provided support for our second hypothesis: Lower-
class participants who were made to believe that social class 
is an essentialist category reported experiencing greater neg-
ative self-conscious emotions than upper-class participants, 
























Figure 2. Interaction between manipulated lay theories about 
social class and objective social class on the experience of 
negative self-conscious emotions in Study 2.
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who were made to believe that social class is not rooted in 
biology. These findings converge on the idea that nonessen-
tialist beliefs can help to buffer lower-class individuals 
against experiencing negative self-conscious emotions that, 
when experienced chronically, can be detrimental to health. 
Interestingly, the manipulation of essentialist beliefs moder-
ated associations between social class and negative affect in 
general, as well as self-conscious affect in particular, but did 
not shift participant positive emotions.
Thus far, the results from our first two studies provide 
evidence for our central hypotheses that lay theories about 
social class moderate associations between social class and 
both self-rated health and negative self-conscious affect. 
Study 3 extends these findings by examining whether the 
same manipulation of lay theories of social class shifts asso-
ciations between social class and self-rated health while test-
ing the potential mediating role of negative self-conscious 
affect in this process.
Study 3: Lay Theories About Social 
Class, Self-Rated Health, and Negative 
Self-Conscious Affect
We had three goals in Study 3: First, we wanted to replicate 
the effects of lay theories of social class obtained in Studies 
1 and 2 with a larger sample of participants. Second, we 
wanted to provide further support for the moderating role of 
lay theories of social class on momentary shifts in self-rated 
health using an experimental design, allowing for an initial 
test of causal associations. Third, we tested the potential 
mediating role of negative self-conscious affect in explain-
ing the relationships between social class, essentialist beliefs, 
and self-rated health.
Before describing this research, we acknowledge that we 
do not expect the manipulation of lay theories of social class 
to shift actual health outcomes for our participants. Rather, 
we expect that lay theories of social class will change tempo-
rary perceptions of both one’s health and affect—such that 
lower-class individuals exposed to essentialist beliefs about 
social class will report momentarily lower self-rated health, 
whereas those exposed to nonessentialist beliefs will show 
no class-based differences in temporary health perceptions. 
Such a result would be consistent with the hypothesized rela-
tionships between social class, lay theories, and chronic 
health outcomes.
Method
Participants. Three hundred forty-five undergraduate stu-
dents enrolled in psychology courses at the University of Illi-
nois participated in this study (217 females, 128 males). This 
sample size was obtained following recommendations that 
large sample sizes can provide more precise estimates of 
effects (Cumming, 2014). Data collection was scheduled for 
one full academic year, and analyses were not conducted 
prior to the collection of the full sample. Participants’ mean 
age was 19.42 years (SD = 1.42). The majority of partici-
pants were European American (n = 113), followed by Other 
(n = 87), Asian American (n = 82), Latino/a (n = 43), African 
American (n = 29), and Native American (n = 2). Partici-
pants were allowed to enter more than one ethnic category. 
All participants were included in the analyses except in cases 
where they had missing data.
Procedure. Participants completed the study through com-
puter terminals in the lab. They were first directed to read a 
consent document for the study ostensibly designed to exam-
ine relationships between personality and attitudes about 
society. Similar to our design in Study 2, participants were 
first told their memory for and retention of material in scien-
tific articles will be assessed, which formed our manipula-
tion of their lay beliefs about social class. After which, 
participants answered questions about their emotions, fol-
lowed by their general health. Finally, participants answered 
some questions about their social class mobility beliefs and 
demographic information. Participants were probed for sus-
picion and debriefed regarding the hypotheses of the study at 
the end. None of them were able to successfully guess the 
hypotheses of the study.
Materials
Manipulation of lay theories about social class. Our manipu-
lation of lay theories about social class was similar to that of 
Study 2, except in one respect—Participants in this study read 
two mock scientific news articles instead of one. To enhance 
the cover story for the present investigation and limit the 
chances that participants would correctly guess our hypotheses, 
all participants began the experiment by reading the same filler 
article about willpower in eating and dieting. Following this 
article, participants read the second article—either the biologi-
cal (essentialist perspective) or nonbiological basis (nonessen-
tialist perspective) of social class article, as in Study 2.
To assess the effectiveness of the manipulation, we asked 
attention check questions to assess how much information 
participants remembered for both articles they read. For the 
first article on willpower, we asked participants whether the 
article argument was consistent with the statement, “Having 
sweets readily available should decrease your desire of them.” 
This manipulation check item allowed us to determine if both 
experimental groups attended to the article information 
equally. For the second article on the (non)genetic basis of 
social class, we asked participants to rate how much the arti-
cle argument was consistent with the statements, “Social class 
is stable, inherent, and biologically determined” and “There is 
no genetic basis to social class.” (reverse-scored). Both state-
ments were rated on 7-point Likert-type scales (1 = strongly 
disagree, 7 = strongly agree) and were reliable (M = 3.62 
SD = 2.11, α = .87). As such, these latter items were averaged 
to give a single score, where higher scores indicated stronger 
essentialist beliefs about social class.
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Negative self-conscious emotions. We measured partici-
pants’ negative self-conscious emotions using the same list 
of emotions in Study 2 and asked them to rate the extent to 
which they experienced those emotions after reading the arti-
cle. All emotions were rated on a 5-point Likert-type scale 
(1 = not at all, 5 = extremely). The negative self-conscious 
emotions (i.e., nervous, guilt, shame, and anxious) were reli-
able (M = 1.60, SD = .72, α = .82) and were averaged to form 
a single index, where higher scores indicated greater expe-
rience of negative self-conscious emotions. As in Study 2, 
we also computed the composite of the three-item hostility-
related emotions (M = 1.43, SD = .64, α = .65), all negative 
emotions (M = 1.50, SD = .60, α = .88), and all positive emo-
tions (M = 1.90, SD = .85, α = .88).
Self-rated general health. Participants’ self-rated physical 
health was assessed by the single-item measure of general 
physical health adapted from the Short Form 36-item Health 
Survey (Ware & Sherbourne, 1992) used in Study 1. Par-
ticipants rated how much they agreed with the statement, 
“In general, my health is good” (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = 
strongly agree; M = 4.09, SD = .77).
Social class. We assessed participants’ objective social 
class and subjective social class rank using the same mea-
sures in Study 2. For objective social class, we standard-
ized participants’ reported family income and education 
attainment, and averaged them to obtain a single objec-
tive social class index, where higher scores indicate higher 
objective social class. Some participants did not report 
their family income (n = 7) or mother’s (n = 9) and father’s 
(n = 14) education attainment. For subjective social class rank 
(M = 6.71, SD = 1.63), two participants did not report it. 
Objective and subjective social class were again correlated, 
r(340) = .42, p < .001.
Results
Manipulation check. An independent-samples t test revealed 
that participants reported stronger essentialist beliefs when 
they read that social class had a biological basis (M = 5.18, 
SD = 1.55) than those who read that social class was not 
biologically based (M = 2.13, SD = 1.37), t(341) = −19.28, 
p < .001. Both groups did not differ in their ratings of the 
statement related to the willpower article, t(340) = 1.11, p = 
.27. Overall, these findings suggest that our manipulation 
was successful in manipulating participants’ beliefs about 
social class.
Lay theories and negative self-conscious emotions. To test if lay 
theories about social class moderate the association between 
social class and momentary reports of negative self-con-
scious emotions, we ran a hierarchical linear regression with 
participants’ objective social class, lay beliefs in social class 
categories (coded 0 = nonessentialist beliefs, 1 = essentialist 
beliefs) and their interaction as the predictor variables, and 
with their level of experienced negative self-conscious emo-
tions as the criterion variable. There were no main effects of 
objective social class, β = −.02, t(339) = −0.36, p = .72, 95% 
CI = [−.13, .09], and lay beliefs about social class, β = .05, 
t(339) = 0.99, p = .32, 95% CI = [−.05, .16], on participants’ 
negative self-conscious emotions. Consistent with Study 2 
findings, we found a significant interaction between partici-
pants’ objective social class and lay beliefs about social class 
on the experience of negative self-conscious emotions, 
β = −.20, t(338) = −2.58, p = .01, 95% CI = [−.35, −.05].
Analyses of simple slopes revealed that among partici-
pants who read that social class is biologically determined, 
lower-class participants reported experiencing greater nega-
tive self-conscious emotions than their upper-class counter-
parts, β = −.16, t(338) = −2.08, p = .04, 95% CI = [−.31, 
−.01]. In contrast, no difference was observed in the experi-
ence of negative self-conscious emotions between lower-
class and upper-class participants who read that social class 
is not biologically based, β = .12, t(338) = 1.57, p = .12, 95% 
CI = [−.03, .27]. In addition, lower-class participants who 
read the nonessentialist perspective also reported experienc-
ing significantly less negative self-conscious emotions com-
pared with lower-class participants who read the essentialist 
perspective, β = .20, t(338) = 2.54, p = .01, 95% CI = [.04, 
.35] (see Figure 3).
We did not obtain any effect of interaction between objec-
tive social class and lay beliefs about social class on the over-
all negative emotions index, β = −.12, t(338) = −1.63, p = 
.11, 95% CI = [−.27, .03], and the overall positive emotions 
index, β = .07, t(338) = 0.86, p = .39, 95% CI = [−.09, .22].
To more definitively determine if lay theories of social 
class moderate relationships between social class and self-
conscious emotions in particular, we ran a three-way mixed 
ANOVA with lay theories about social class as the between-
subjects factor, objective social class as the covariate, and 
type of emotion (negative self-conscious emotions vs. hostile 
























Figure 3. Interaction between manipulated lay theories about 
social class and objective social class on the experience of 
negative self-conscious emotions in Study 3.
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found the expected significant three-way interaction, F(1, 
338) = 8.29, p = .004. We probed this three-way interaction 
and found the predicted two-way interaction effect between 
social class and lay beliefs on negative self-conscious emo-
tions, β = .16, t(338) = 2.04, p = .04, 95% CI = [.006, .30], 
but not on hostility-related emotions, β = −.02, t(338) = 
−0.28, p = .78, 95% CI = [−.17, .13]. The results from this 
study indicate that the effect of lay theories of social class on 
the relationship between social class and momentary shifts in 
negative affect is specific to the experience of negative self-
conscious emotions.
Lay theories and self-rated general health. We examined the 
influence of manipulated lay theories of social class on 
momentary shifts in self-rated health using the same hierar-
chical linear regression predicting participants’ self-rated 
general health index. There were no significant main effects 
of objective social class, β = .09, t(339) = 1.59, p = .11, 95% 
CI = [−.02, .19], or beliefs about social class, β= −.03, t(339) 
= −0.60, p = .55, 95% CI = [−.14, .07] on participants’ self-
rated general health. Nevertheless, consistent with the pat-
tern of findings in Study 1, we found a significant interaction 
between participants’ objective social class and beliefs about 
social class on self-rated general health, β = .16, t(338) = 
2.04, p = .04, 95% CI = [.006, .30].
Simple slopes analyses revealed that among those who 
read that social class is biologically determined, lower-class 
participants self-rated poorer general health than upper-class 
participants, β = .20, t(338) = 2.57, p = .01, 95% CI = [.05, 
.35]. Conversely, lower-class and upper-class participants 
who read that social class is not biologically determined did 
not report any difference in their self-rated general health, β 
= −.02, t(338) = −0.31, p = .76, 95% CI = [−.17, .13]. There 
was also a nonsignificant tendency for lower-class partici-
pants who read the nonessentialist perspective to report bet-
ter general health than lower-class participants who read the 
essentialist perspective, β = −.15, t(338) = −1.88, p = .06, 
95% CI = [−.30, .006] (see Figure 4). These findings provide 
additional support for our central hypothesis: Lower-class 
individuals exposed to essentialist beliefs reported lower 
self-rated health relative to upper-class individuals, but this 
relationship was attenuated for individuals exposed to nones-
sentialist beliefs.
Consistent with Studies 1 and 2, subjective social class, 
again, did not interact with lay beliefs about social class to 
produce any effects on self-rated general health, β = .04, 
t(338) = 0.46, p = .65, 95% CI = [−.12, .19], or negative self-
conscious emotions, β = −.01, t(338) = −0.15, p = .88, 95% 
CI = [−.16, .14]. We return to these findings in the “General 
Discussion” section.
Moderated mediation analysis. We expected the tendency for 
essentialist beliefs to moderate associations between social 
class and self-rated health to be explained by levels of 
reported negative self-conscious affect. We tested this 
moderated mediation model with negative self-conscious 
emotion as the proposed mediator of the association between 
social class and self-rated health for participants exposed to 
essentialist (vs. nonessentialist) beliefs using PROCESS 
(Hayes, 2013). In our overall model for this analysis, we 
entered objective social class as the independent variable, 
negative self-conscious emotions as the mediator, lay theo-
ries about social class as the moderator, and self-rated gen-
eral health as the outcome variable (see Figure 5).
The analysis yielded two multiple regression models: The 
first model estimated the path coefficients for the mediator 
model (with negative self-conscious emotions as the depen-
dent variable) while the second model estimated the path 
coefficients for the dependent variable model (with self-rated 
health as the dependent variable). The mediator model 
yielded a significant interaction effect between social class 
and lay theories about social class on negative self-conscious 
emotions as the mediator, β = −.10, t(338) = −2.58, p = .01. 
The dependent variable model showed that negative self-
conscious emotions as the mediator significantly predicted 
self-rated health as the dependent variable, β = −.23, t(339) = 
−4.16, p < .001. Finally, using bootstrapping procedures with 
5,000 resamples to obtain the bootstrap 95% bias corrected 

















Figure 4. Interaction between manipulated lay theories about 
social class and objective social class on self-rated health in Study 3.
Figure 5. Moderated mediation model: Lay theories about 
social class moderate the experience of negative self-conscious 
emotions as a pathway linking social class to self-rated health.
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conditional indirect effect at each level of lay beliefs about 
social class: nonessentialist perspective of social class (coded 
−1), and essentialist perspective of social class (coded 1). 
Specifically, the analysis revealed that when participants 
read the nonessentialist perspective of social class, there was 
no indirect relationship between objective social class and 
self-rated health, 95% BC CI = [−.06, .0001]. However, 
when participants read the essentialist perspective of social 
class, there was a significant indirect relationship between 
objective social class and self-rated health, 95% BC CI = 
[.002, .08].3 This analysis provides evidence that is consis-
tent with our moderated mediation hypothesis: The tendency 
for lower-class individuals to report poorer self-rated health 
than upper-class individuals when exposed to essentialist, 
relative to nonessentialist, beliefs is accounted for by reports 
of negative self-conscious affect.
Discussion
Study 3 provided empirical support for each of our three 
hypotheses using a manipulation of exposure to lay theories 
about social class: Consistent with our first two hypotheses, 
exposure to essentialist beliefs about social class led lower-
class individuals to report momentary reductions in self-
rated health and increases in negative self-conscious affect 
than their upper-class counterparts, whereas exposure to 
nonessentialist beliefs elicited no such class-based differ-
ences in self-rated health and affect. In line with our third 
hypothesis, the tendency for lay theories of social class to 
moderate associations between social class and self-rated 
health was explained by negative self-conscious affect. The 
results of Study 3 provide an initial demonstration of the 
capacity for lay theories about social class to moderate asso-
ciations between perceptions of one’s health and negative 
self-conscious affect—at least as they occur in the moments 
directly following exposure to these lay theories.
Unlike Study 2, the results of Study 3 indicate that lay 
theories of social class moderate associations between social 
class and negative self-conscious affect in particular, rather 
than general negative affect more generally. The inconsis-
tency between the two study findings might be explained by 
the larger sample used in Study 3 or by regional differences 
in emotional experiences for students attending West Coast 
versus Midwestern universities. Future systematic work is 
necessary to better understand these differences in emotion 
responding.
More important, although our moderated mediation anal-
ysis found relationships that are consistent with the predic-
tion that negative self-conscious affect mediates the tendency 
for lay theories of social class to moderate associations 
between social class and negative self-rated health, these 
results were collected at the same time point. As such, any 
causal claims about relationships between self-conscious 
affect and self-rated health cannot be supported by these data 
(Judd, Yzerbyt, & Muller, 2014).
General Discussion
By virtue of being born into a lower social class in American 
society, research indicates that individuals, on average, are 
more likely to face poorer physical health, increased nega-
tive affect, and higher mortality rates throughout their life 
course (Adler et al., 1994). In this research, we proposed and 
examined the possibility that lay theories that people hold 
about social class categories can mitigate class-related health 
disparities. Across three studies, we found that while lower-
class individuals were more likely to report experiencing 
poorer health and greater negative self-conscious emotions 
compared with upper-class individuals when they endorsed 
essentialist beliefs about social class, this class-based differ-
ence was not observed when participants endorsed nones-
sentialist beliefs about social class.
We also found preliminary support for a mechanism under-
lying these effects (Study 3)—that lay theories about social 
class can influence lower-class individuals’ health perceptions 
by either increasing or decreasing negative self-conscious 
emotions. That we observed a relationship between health per-
ceptions and reports of negative self-conscious affect is con-
sistent with research suggesting that experiencing elevated 
negative self-conscious emotions is associated with poorer 
health in the long run (e.g., Dickerson & Kemeny, 2004).
Study Limitations
In this research, we made the prediction that because essen-
tialist beliefs suggest that social class is biological and fixed, 
individuals from relatively lower-class backgrounds who 
endorse these beliefs will come to experience chronic nega-
tive self-conscious affect and, as a result, poorer health than 
upper-class individuals. In contrast, lower-class individuals 
who endorse nonessentialist beliefs—beliefs that class is not 
biological and has the possibility for change—would attenu-
ate class-based differences in health and affect. Although the 
reported results are largely consistent with these predictions, 
any attempt to apply the findings here to broader health out-
comes should be met with caution for several reasons that we 
articulate below.
Although Study 1 examined self-rated health in a sample 
of adults, the results reported were correlational in nature, 
and so there is a real possibility that an unaccounted for third 
variable could explain the capacity for lay theories of social 
class to moderate associations between social class and self-
rated health in that study. We were able to observe the pre-
dicted effects of lay theories of social class while controlling 
for participant gender and ethnicity, but other unaccounted 
for variables could still explain these associations, and this 
issue merits further empirical investigation.
Our predictions suggest that essentialist beliefs elicit poor 
health through chronic negative self-conscious affect, but 
our empirical findings in Studies 2 and 3 involve assess-
ments of health and affect at a single time point. We interpret 
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these findings as suggesting that lay theories of social class 
are causal in moderating associations between social class 
and momentary perceptions of health and affect, but future 
research is necessary before we can conclude that lay theo-
ries of social class play a causal role in moderating associa-
tions between social class and actual health or chronic affect. 
Future research employing a longitudinal design that exam-
ines how changes in lay theories about social class shape 
prospective changes in health and affect is critical for evalu-
ating our model’s capacity to predict real health outcomes. 
As well, because our model examines self-rated health, it is 
not able to test the specific physiological pathways (e.g., pro-
inflammatory processes, epigenetic factors) by which lay 
theories of social class shape health outcomes.
Although Studies 2 and 3 involve an experimental manip-
ulation of lay theories of social class, the samples involved 
healthy students attending a 4-year university. Given that 
university settings are a primary means to ascend the class 
hierarchy, it is possible that less upwardly mobile samples 
would respond differently to lay theories of social class. For 
instance, perhaps older individuals from relatively lower-
class backgrounds with longer histories of chronic subordi-
nate status in society might view nonessentialist beliefs as 
having less possibility for upward mobility and, as a result, 
may exhibit similar patterns of health and negative affect as 
those who endorse essentialist beliefs. Our theoretical pre-
dictions suggest that nonessentialist beliefs moderate class-
based health outcomes because, unlike essentialist beliefs, 
they suggest that subordinate status is not biological and may 
change in the future. Given this logic, it is possible that an 
examination of older samples would reveal that nonessen-
tialist beliefs are less powerful in buffering lower-class indi-
viduals from poor health and negative affect.
In addition, we tested our lay theories of social class 
model on relatively healthy and well-adjusted university stu-
dents (Studies 2 and 3)—as evidenced by a lack of main 
effect of social class on negative self-conscious affect. A 
fuller understanding of the capacity for lay theories of social 
class to buffer relatively lower-class individuals from poorer 
health and negative affect would involve samples of indi-
viduals who are closer to levels of poverty—given that 
effects of social class on well-being are stronger when exam-
ined nearer to levels of poverty (Howell & Howell, 2008). 
An investigation in such samples would provide a more 
definitive test of our hypotheses. Without such an investiga-
tion, it is unclear whether the predicted effects of lay theories 
of social class would be overwhelmed by the adverse effects 
of resource scarcity that characterize conditions of poverty.
It is interesting that in the current studies, lay theories of 
social class moderated associations between objective social 
class, self-rated health, and negative self-conscious affect but 
did not shape associations with subjective social class. Given 
past work highlighting the importance of perceptions of sub-
jective social class on experiences of health and on social 
cognition (Adler et al., 2000; Kraus, Tan, & Tannenbaum, 
2013), it is interesting to speculate about why this pattern of 
results occurred specifically in these studies. One possibility 
for this lack of moderation might be that because subjective 
social class is comprised of perceptions of one’s position in 
the social class hierarchy vis-à-vis others, lay beliefs about 
social class are encompassed, at least partially, by participant 
ratings of subjective social class. This overlap would make 
moderation findings using the subjective social class assess-
ment less observable in empirical investigations. Lending 
support to this perspective, prior research shows that people 
who rate themselves higher in subjective social class report 
elevated levels of endorsement of essentialist beliefs, whereas 
objective social class shows no such associations (Kraus & 
Keltner, 2013).
A second potential reason for the lack of moderation of 
associations between subjective social class and health or 
affect is our use of university samples in Studies 2 and 3. 
Although subjective social class shows associations with 
patterns of perception and social cognition in these samples 
(for a review, see Kraus, Piff, Mendoza-Denton, 
Rheinschmidt, & Keltner, 2012), it is possible that the con-
struct might not predict measures of chronic affect and well-
being as strongly in healthy student samples. University 
students are relatively young and healthy, and as such their 
understanding of their rank in society might not track as 
cleanly with their actual well-being as it does with adult sam-
ples. In addition, the well-being of university students may 
be more tightly linked to other forms of subjective status 
than those tied to social class: For instance, in a study of 
university students and healthy adults, subjective well-being 
was more strongly associated with sociometric status (i.e., 
respect and prestige in face-to-face social groups) than it was 
with measures of social class (Anderson, Kraus, Galinsky, & 
Keltner, 2012). It is possible that university students’ well-
being is uniquely tied to social standing within their small 
intimate social groups, whereas as individuals become older 
and develop a clearer understanding of their position in the 
class hierarchy, subjective social class exerts a more power-
ful influence on health and affect. Future research is neces-
sary to examine this possibility.
Caveats and Future Directions
Our findings also accord with work inspired by social iden-
tity theory, which showed that the extent to which individu-
als identify with a social group depends, in part, on whether 
social group boundaries are permeable (Ellemers, Spears, & 
Doosje, 1999; Ellemers, van Knippenberg, De Vries, & 
Wilke, 1988; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). More specifically, prior 
research has demonstrated that when class boundaries are 
perceived to be impermeable, this will encourage lower sta-
tus individuals to self-categorize in terms of a lower-class 
group membership. Having done so, they are then more 
likely to internalize the beliefs, values, and norms of that 
group membership, including those that pertain to physical 
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and mental health (C. Haslam et al., 2012; Jetten, Haslam, & 
Haslam, 2012). This logic suggests that essentialist beliefs 
will not inevitably elicit poor health in lower-class individu-
als—particularly if a lower-class identity is associated with 
positive health behaviors or cognitions.
In our theorizing, we suggested that nonessentialist beliefs 
would buffer lower-class individuals from experiencing 
poorer health and negative self-conscious affect because, 
relative to essentialist beliefs, these beliefs suggest that a 
person’s subordinate status is not determined by his or her 
own inferior biology and holds the possibility for change in 
the future. Future research would do well to examine the 
influence of nonessentialist beliefs on low-status individuals 
with varying levels of possibility for future status attainment. 
For instance, if nonessentialist beliefs only relate to better 
health outcomes to the extent that they highlight the possibil-
ity of future status attainment, then individuals who cannot 
ascend the status hierarchy should experience no health or 
affect benefits from this belief system. This logic underlines 
why our findings might have been particularly likely to 
emerge while studying relatively young and upwardly mobile 
university students.
This logic underscores the importance of studying these 
findings with respect to levels of actual class mobility. 
Specifically, low-status individuals from cultures with high 
levels of class mobility may benefit particularly strongly 
from nonessentialist beliefs—where status attainment in the 
future is more possible—whereas those in countries with low 
mobility may receive weaker benefits to their health and 
affect from endorsing nonessentialist beliefs (e.g., 
Mahalingam, 2007).
Related to this point, we contend that the moderating role 
of lay theories of social class should operate independently 
of perceptions of personal control. Although nonessentialist 
beliefs buffer lower-class individuals from momentary 
reports of poorer self-rated health and negative self-con-
scious affect, these beliefs are not likely to elicit increases in 
personal control: Whereas essentialist beliefs place control 
of group status in fixed biology, nonessentialist beliefs sug-
gest that group status may be determined by nonbiological 
causes both within and outside one’s control (e.g., discrimi-
nation, unequal opportunities). Underscoring this point, in 
Study 2 we collected a measure of perceived personal control 
from prior research (Lachman & Weaver, 1998), finding that 
our manipulation of lay theories of social class had no influ-
ence on this metric of control beliefs, t(69) = −0.20, p = .76. 
As well, a survey of online Mechanical Turk workers (N = 
205) revealed a nonsignificant relationship (r = −.03, ns) 
between our essentialism scale and the same measure of per-
ceived personal control. The findings reported in the present 
investigation appear to operate independently of perceptions 
of personal control. Nevertheless, future research would be 
needed to elucidate the key aspects of nonessentialist beliefs 
that contribute to its apparent protective effects for lower-
class individuals.
Although the social class health gradient suggests that 
being lower class leaves one more vulnerable to poorer 
health, we argue that it is not an inevitable outcome. In our 
present research, we demonstrate that fostering beliefs about 
the stability of one’s current low status may offer insights 
into improving the health outcomes of these individuals.
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Notes
1. Additional analyses using subscales of the Short Form (SF)-36 
Health Survey are described in the supplementary materials.
2. We also examined separately the interaction effects for lay 
theories about social class with participants’ income, and with 
participants’ educational attainment in terms of high school 
(coded as −1) versus college (coded as 1). The analyses did not 
yield any significant interaction for lay theories with income, 
β = .38, t(150) = 1.57, p = .12, 95% confidence interval (CI) = 
[−.10, .85], and lay theories with educational attainment, β = .11, 
t(164) = 1.40, p = .16, 95% CI = [−.04, .26].
3. The moderated mediation model reported in the results of Study 
3 is consistent with prior research that indicates that chronic 
experiences of negative self-conscious affect may elicit poor 
health outcomes (Dickerson & Kemeny, 2004; Gruenewald, 
Kemeny, Aziz, & Fahey, 2004). However, because health and 
affect variables were collected at the same time point, it is 
impossible for this study to establish directionality between neg-
ative self-conscious affect and self-rated health (Judd, Yzerbyt, 
& Muller, 2014). To highlight this point, we ran a moderated 
mediation analysis with self-rated health as the mediator and 
negative self-conscious emotions as the outcome variable. The 
analysis showed that self-rated health was a significant media-
tor between social class and negative self-conscious emotions 
for participants who read about essentialist theories about social 
class, 95% bias corrected confidence interval (BC CI) = [−.09, 
−.007], but not for those who read about nonessentialist theories 
about social class, 95% BC CI = [−.02, .03].
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The online supplemental material is available at http://pspb. 
sagepub.com/supplemental.
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